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Funding for this evaluation was provided in whole by the Missouri Foundation for Health.
Founded in 2000, MFH is an independent nonprofit organization and the largest nongovernmental funder
of community health activities for the state. Having provided nearly $350 million in funding to date, MFH
and its programs and grants support activities that improve the health of Missouri’s citizens,
particularly the uninsured and underserved populations.

Executive Summary
In 2004, the Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH) announced the nine-year Tobacco Prevention
and Cessation Initiative (TPCI) focused on reducing the health effects and economic toll of tobacco
use on Missouri residents.
The first phase of TPCI (2005-2008) comprised three strategies:
l		

Strategy 1: Increase the Tax on Tobacco Products

l

Strategy 2: Implement Smokefree Workplace Programs

l

Strategy 3: Promote School-Based Prevention Programs

Due to the significant investment MFH has made in TPCI, there was a need for an economic
evaluation to assess the Foundation’s return on investment. This report presents the results
from the economic evaluation conducted by the Center for Tobacco Policy Research (CTPR) at
Washington University in St. Louis. Although there have been several economic evaluations of
individual tobacco cessation and prevention programs, there have been few, if any, to date that
have examined a tobacco control initiative with multiple strategies. For this analysis, CTPR focused
on the first three strategies of TPCI.

Methods
Both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis approaches were used. The costs, benefits, and
cost-to-benefit ratios for all three strategies were calculated individually and then combined. Due
to the tobacco tax increase not passing, two different scenarios were assessed: 1) the actual election
outcome of the tax not passing; and 2) the benefits that would have been gained if the tax had
passed. In any economic evaluation a number of assumptions are made; this evaluation took the
most conservative approach in its assumptions. See the full report for a detailed description of the
methods used, including the calculations of the costs and benefits, and all assumptions made.

Evaluation Highlights
The Initiative resulted in savings, despite the
failure of the tobacco tax increase.
The total combined benefits for the three
TPCI strategies during the time period
resulted in real savings: 5,228 quality
adjusted life years (QALYs) gained and
long-term medical care savings of $30.5
million. Therefore, a positive return on
investment was seen in the “reality”
scenario, despite the tobacco tax
not passing.

TPCI costs and benefits for the two tax scenarios
If Tax
Passed

Tax Failed
(Reality)
Costs
QALYs Gained*
Long-term Medical
Care Savings
Cost/QALY Gained
Medical Care Savings/
Dollar Spent

$7,066,434

$7,066,434

5,228

105,526

$30,510,165

$616,497,054

$1,352

$67

$4

$87

* Quality Adjusted Life Years
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The success of the tobacco tax strategy would have increased the positive net benefit
of TPCI twenty-fold.
Had the tobacco tax ballot initiative passed, the strategy would have resulted in large benefits
both in regard to QALYs and long-term medical savings for the people of Missouri. For every $1
spent on TPCI, there would have been medical care savings of $87.24 vs. $4.32.
Policy changes result in the
largest benefit.

Conclusions
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Grantees from both the school and
workplace strategies were involved
in advocating for policy changes,
in addition to providing cessation
services and educational programs
in the schools. Within the school and
workplace-based strategies, smokefree policy changes, particularly on
the community level, showed two
to six times higher cost-benefit/costeffectiveness ratios in comparison
to cessation services and youth
education programs.
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The results of our economic evaluation for TPCI during the specified time period show a net
positive benefit across the entire initiative, as well as for the workplace and youth prevention
strategies individually. These results provide valuable lessons learned and important information
for future TPCI efforts, other tobacco prevention efforts, and decisions regarding MFH’s future
efforts to improve the health of Missourians in its service area. Due to current plans for the
initiative to continue an additional four years, the information presented in this report should
inform future decisions on interventions to support within TPCI as well as the level of resources
to dedicate to TPCI efforts. Based on the evaluation findings, the following recommendations
were identified:

Recommendations
l

Advocate for an increase in the tobacco tax.

l		

Emphasize policy interventions as a main component of a comprehensive
		 effort to reduce tobacco use.
l		

Continue to conduct cost analyses for the Tobacco Prevention and
		 Cessation Initiative and expand the practice to all Missouri Foundation 		
		 for Health initiatives.

Center for Tobacco Policy Research

Introduction
Due to the burden of tobacco use in Missouri and limited funding for tobacco prevention and
cessation programs, the Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH) identified tobacco use as a major
health issue in its service area of 84 counties and the City of St. Louis. In 2004, MFH announced
the nine-year Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Initiative (TPCI) focused on reducing the health
effects and economic toll of tobacco use on Missouri residents.
The first phase of TPCI (2005-2008) comprised three strategies:
l		

Strategy 1: Increase the Tax on Tobacco Products An education campaign to increase
		 awareness about the effectiveness of increasing the price of tobacco products on preventing 				
		 youth from smoking and increasing the number of adults who quit.
Strategy 2: Implement Smokefree Workplace Programs A workplace and community strategy
		 for which grantees increase access to cessation resources (e.g., classes) and advocate for
		 smokefree workplaces.
l

Strategy 3: Promote School-Based Prevention Programs A youth-focused strategy that included
		 three different programs carried out in Missouri schools that educated students on the burden 		
		 of tobacco use and promoted youth advocating for policy change.
l

In subsequent years, TPCI has added two other strategies: eliminating tobacco-related disparities
and supporting local tobacco control policy change. In total, MFH has supported more than 70
organizations, contractors, and partners’ efforts to implement tobacco prevention and cessation
programming, with more than $22 million in grants since the beginning of the initiative.
In any public health initiative, stakeholders often question whether the investment can be
justified by the outcomes. Due to the significant investment MFH has made in TPCI, there was
a need for an economic evaluation to assess the Foundation’s return on investment. This report
presents the results from the economic evaluation conducted by the Center for Tobacco Policy
Research at Washington University in St. Louis. Although there have been several economic
evaluations of individual tobacco cessation and prevention programs, there have been few, if any,
to date that have examined a tobacco control initiative with multiple strategies. For this analysis,
CTPR focused on the first three strategies of TPCI. This will serve as the first of additional
economic analyses that will be conducted during the remainder of TPCI.
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Methods
Standard methods for economic evaluations were used.1 The costs, benefits, and cost-to-benefit
ratios for all three strategies were calculated individually and then combined. In any economic
evaluation a number of assumptions are made; this evaluation took the most conservative
approach in its assumptions. A detailed description of the assumptions on costs, benefits, and
their valuation in monetary terms is included in the Appendix.
For this evaluation, both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis approaches were used. A
cost-effectiveness analysis allows different interventions to be assessed based on what it costs to
achieve a particular outcome (e.g., smoking cessation). A strength of cost-effectiveness analysis
is that it allows combining cost data with outcome or effectiveness data (i.e., few adjustments
have to be made).1 If a program has a strong and
comprehensive evaluation, those data are often
available. A challenge with cost-effectiveness
analysis is that you can only make comparisons
Cost-Effectiveness vs.
with programs that have the same outcome.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

For cost-benefit analysis, costs and benefits
are assessed in monetary terms. Thus, each
intervention can be examined on its own and
compared to interventions with different
objectives. The difficulty of assigning a value
to particular outcomes can make cost-benefit
analysis a challenge. We applied both approaches
for economic evaluations to allow for examining
the costs of a particular outcome, as well as
comparisons in monetary terms across and within
the TPCI strategies.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
l Benefits are assessed in terms of
		 outcomes (e.g., youth prevented
		 from smoking)
l		 Analysis identifies the cost of 					
		 achieving a specific outcome
l		 E.g., The program costs $350 per 			
		 smoker who stays quit
Cost-Benefit Analysis
l All benefits and costs are described
		 in monetary terms
l		 Analysis determines if the cost is 		
		 less than the value of the benefit
l		 E.g., For every dollar spent, $5,000
		 is saved in medical care costs

Benefits were measured in quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs) gained and life-time medical
care savings per smoker who quit or youth
prevented from smoking. A discount rate of
3% was used. This is not to be confused with
adjusting for inflation. Discount rates are used to
adjust for costs, benefits, etc. distributed across
time.1 Money that is received today is usually
considered more valuable than the same amount
received in the future, thus future costs or benefits are discounted.

Center for Tobacco Policy Research
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Calculation of Costs
The time periods for the three TPCI strategies assessed were:
l

Strategy 1 – Campaign to Increase Tobacco Tax: 2005-2006

l

Strategies 2 & 3 – School and Workplace Programs: 2007-2008

The efforts to increase the tobacco tax took place during the two-year period of 2005 & 2006 only.
For the school and workplace strategies, the time period selected was based on the availability of
comprehensive data. In January 2007, grantees began reporting data on their efforts via an online
data collection system.
Only direct program costs were included in the analyses. Costs not included for any of the
strategies were MFH staff salaries, costs associated with the initiative evaluation, trainings for
grantees, and other capacity building activities not directly related to grantees’ programs. For
the tobacco tax strategy, the total funding provided by MFH for the education portion of the
tobacco tax initiative was determined. The funding contributed by other organizations for both
the education portion as well as the political campaign was also calculated. These costs did not
include volunteer hours as those data were not available. The program was heavily dependent
on volunteers; unfortunately, records only show the number of volunteers involved and not the
amount of time they contributed.
For the workplace and school strategies, we combined the amount of funding distributed by MFH
to all grantees implementing programs specifically for these two strategies. For each grantee, we
divided its funding by the number of months in its grant award. This allowed us to come up with
an estimate of funding for grantees with grants that preceded or continued after the time period
we were evaluating (i.e., 2007-2008).
For grantees that were funded to implement both strategies, it was unclear how much was
allocated to each strategy. Therefore, after calculating the amount of funding for the time period,
the amount was divided in half for each strategy. Funding amounts for grantees for which there
were no records of their activities for the specified time period, 8 out of 44, were not included in
the analyses. Additional funding grantees received to implement their programs were also added
to the total costs along with the value of volunteer hours.

Calculation of Benefits
Data used in the calculation of benefits were provided by grantees and in most cases were
estimates. There are other benefits not accounted for that may have resulted from these programs,
including capacity-building within the grantee communities. Therefore, in many ways we took
the most conservative approach in calculating the benefits of TPCI’s programs.
To keep the analyses standard across all three strategies, two primary benefits that could be
calculated were chosen: quality-adjusted life years gained (QALYs) and lifetime medical care
savings. These benefits are common in cost-benefit analyses and can be calculated whether you
are examining adults who quit or youth prevented from smoking.
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Effectiveness of a Tobacco Tax
In assessing the tobacco tax strategy, two different scenarios were examined. The first scenario
was the actual election outcome, the failure to pass the tobacco tax increase. In November 2006,
Missouri voters rejected the proposed tax increase; 51.4% against, 48.6% in support. The number
of adults influenced to quit or youth influenced to not start because of the educational campaign
were assumed to be minimal and not included in the analysis of benefits. The second scenario
was hypothetical scenario based on the benefits that would have been gained if the tobacco tax
increase had passed. Increasing the price of tobacco products is one of the best ways to reduce
tobacco use initiation and increase cessation.4 The strategy of increasing Missouri’s tobacco tax
will continue to be a recommended practice for the state and thus warranted further examination
of the benefits that would have been gained if the tax increase had passed.
To calculate the anticipated benefits if the tax had passed, established price elasticity measures
from the literature on tobacco taxes were used.2,3 Price elasticity measures the responsiveness of a
variable (e.g., cigarette sales) to a change in price. For example, for every 10% increase in the price
of cigarettes, it is estimated that cigarette consumption is reduced by 3-5%. Since youth and young
adults are more responsive to price increases, price elasticities by age group were used, starting
with 15-17 year olds.3 The estimated decrease in smoking prevalence was calculated for each age
group. Then, the number of smokers anticipated to quit based on the decrease in prevalence was
determined. Data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)5 conducted during
the time period when the tobacco tax increase would have gone into effect were used to calculate
the number of smokers who would quit.
Effectiveness of Smokefree Policy Change
The same procedure described in Ong and Glantz’s 2005 paper to determine the number of
smokers who would quit as a result of the passage of a smokefree policy was followed for this
evaluation.6 The procedure accounts for smokers who would quit anyway, a 90% compliance rate
for community-wide policy changes, and a 35% relapse rate. Data provided by grantees on policy
changes they were involved in during the time period were used in the calculation. This included
grantees who were involved in workplace and school-based strategies. Community-wide policy
changes were separated from individual worksite policy changes, though the numbers used in the
calculations were the same, except for the compliance rate, which was only used with community
policies. One hundred percent compliance with smokefree policies was assumed for workplaces.
The number of smokers within a community or a worksite was estimated based on a 23.2%
prevalence rate for the state of Missouri from the 2006 BRFSS5, the year prior to policy changes
taking place. Benefits from decreasing or eliminating exposure to secondhand smoke were not
included in our calculations and would be considered to provide additional benefits.
Effectiveness of Cessation Programs
The number of smokers who quit due to their involvement in TPCI-funded cessation classes was
calculated using 12-month quit rate data collected via the TPCI online data collection system.
All grantees were provided a protocol by CTPR to follow when conducting follow-up calls to
assess whether program participants had stopped smoking at three, six, and twelve months after
completing the cessation program. Based on previous research, we assumed a 35% relapse rate for
those who quit.6,7
Center for Tobacco Policy Research
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Effectiveness of Youth Prevention Programs
For the school-based strategy, the most conservative approach for estimating the number of youth
affected by the programs was used. For two of the three programs, only the students reported
to be trained by the grantees were counted. This is because these two programs were primarily
focused on training middle and high school youth to educate their peers and conduct advocacyrelated activities. For the third program, the number of students reported to be involved in
classroom activities was also counted, because a large portion of this program involved lessons
and activities conducted in the classroom. Based on a rate of smoking initiation for youth
estimated at 10.2% in previous research, the number of youth involved in the programs who
would likely become established smokers was calculated.8 Then based on figures reported in the
Institute of Medicine’s Ending the Tobacco Problem: A Blueprint for a Nation, it was estimated that
youth programs would decrease the initiation rate by 10%.8 From there, the number of youth who
would be less likely to initiate smoking due to their involvement in the programs was calculated.
Quality-Adjusted Life Years
Based on the number of adults who quit and
the number of youth prevented from smoking,
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained were
calculated. Quality-adjusted life years take into
account both the quantity and quality of life
gained by an intervention. Two different numbers
for calculating QALYs gained were used; one
for adults and one for youth. For adults quitting
smoking, we used 1.58 QALYs gained per each
sustained quitter based on several past studies.6,7
This estimate assumes the average quitter is 45
years of age and benefits of quitting cease after
the age of 65. For youth, a previously reported estimate
of 3.4 QALYs gained per youth who do not smoke
was used.9,10

What are QALYs?
Quality-adjusted life years take
		 into account both the quantity
		 and quality of life gained by a 				
		 health intervention.
l

l		

A year of perfect health is worth 1;
		 a year of less than perfect health is
		 worth less than 1.

Table 1. Values used to calculate benefits of TPCI components
Benefit
QALYs generated per quitter*

1.58

QALYs generated per youth
not initiating**

3.4

Excess lifetime medical
expenditures for smokers***

$9,231

Lifetime medical savings for youth
who never start smoking***

$19,640

*Keeler et al, 2002 and Ong & Glantz, 2005.
**Kaplan et al, 2007 and Holtgrave et al, 2009
***Hodgson, 1992 (adjusted for inflation to 2007 dollars)
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Results
The costs and benefits for each of the strategies are displayed in Table 2. The table shows the
individual and total costs of the TPCI initiative. The total combined cost for the three TPCI
strategies during the time period we assessed was $7,066,434. The totals for the actual election
outcome (tax amendment failing) and the scenario of the tax passing are presented in two tables.
Table 2 shows the total costs and benefits of all three strategies, with the tobacco tax increase not
passing. The cost-to-benefit is expressed in two ways: cost of each QALY gained and the amount
of long-term medical care savings per dollar spent. The table provides these measures for each
individual strategy and the initiative as a whole. The tobacco tax strategy shows that there were
no benefits gained from the educational campaign. The total combined benefits for the three TPCI
strategies during the time period resulted in real savings: 5,228 QALYs gained and long-term
medical care savings of $30.5 million. Therefore, a positive return on investment was seen in the
“reality” scenario, despite the tobacco tax not passing.

Table 2. Total costs and benefits for TPCI strategies
Total
Long-term
Medical Care
Savings

Total
QALYs
Gained

Cost/
QALY
Gained

Medical
Care Savings/
Dollars Spent

Strategy

Costs

Tobacco Tax

$654,000

0

$0

$0

$0

Workplace

$3,476,210

4,464

$26,078,955

$778.72

$7.50

Schools

$2,936,224

764

$4,431,210

$3,843.23

$1.51

All Strategies Combined

$7,066,434

5,228

$30,510,165

$1,351.65

$4.32

In Table 3, the benefits for both the school and workplace strategies remain the same as in Table
2; however, benefits gained from the tobacco tax strategy are distinctly different. A tobacco tax
increase would have resulted in very large benefits for the people of Missouri: 100,298 QALYs and
more than $585 million in long-term medical care savings. Had the tobacco tax ballot measure
passed, the positive benefits-to-cost results would have been magnified twenty-fold; for every $1
spent on TPCI, there would have been medical care savings of $87.24 vs. $4.32, given the reality of
the tax ballot measure failing. When all of the costs for the tobacco tax campaign are included (i.e.,
costs of education and political campaigns), the benefit-to-cost ratio is still large, $44.07, despite
more than $7 million having been spent.

Center for Tobacco Policy Research
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Table 3. Costs and benefits if tobacco tax increase had passed
Total
QALYs
Gained

Total
Long-term
Medical Care
Savings

Cost/
QALY
Gained

Medical
Care Savings/
Dollars Spent

Strategy

Costs

Tobacco Tax

$654,000

100,298

$585,986,889

$6.52

$896

Workplace

$3,476,210

4,464

$26,078,955

$778.72

$7.50

Schools

$2,936,224

764

$4,431,210

$3,843.23

$1.51

All Strategies Combined

$7,066,434

105,523

$616,497,054

$66.96

$87.24

A Closer Look at Benefits Associated with the
School and Workplace Strategies
The activities and potential outcomes for the workplace and school strategies are more
complicated than they might first appear. Thus, they warrant closer examination and additional
interpretation of the results. For example, for workplaces, it is not simply adults quitting due to
smoking cessation classes that accounts for the positive outcomes, but also the smokefree policy
changes that have occurred in businesses and communities. Likewise, for the school initiative, it
is not only the number of youth who will not initiate smoking, but also the policies youth have
advocated for and helped to pass in their schools, individual businesses, and communities.
Therefore, in Table 4, additional detail has been provided regarding the benefits of TPCI for the
two strategies. Smokefree policy changes show the greatest amount of benefit, particularly for
community-wide policies. Grantees from both the school and workplace strategies were involved
in advocating for policy changes. We estimate that 1,973 adults in Missouri quit smoking due to
community-wide policy changes and an additional 111 adults quit smoking due to worksite policy
changes. As a result of TPCI supported cessation programs, an estimated 902 adults quit smoking,
and stayed quit. For the school programs, we estimate that 150 school-aged children who would
have initiated smoking were prevented from doing so.
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Table 4. Benefits from Each Component of the School and Workplace Strategies
Smokefree Policy Changes
Number of Adults Who Would Quit
		
		 Community-wide policy changes

1,973

QALYs Gained
		
		 Community-wide policy changes

3,117

		 Worksite policy changes

		 Worksite policy changes

Long-Term Medical Care Savings to Society
		
		 Community-wide policy changes
		 Worksite policy changes

111

175
$18,208,270
$1,020,768

Cessation Services
Number of Adults Who Quit		
QALYs Gained
Long-Term Medical Care Savings to Society

902
1,425
$8,326,362

Youth Education
Youth Who Will Not Start Smoking Due to Education Programs

150

QALYs Gained

510

Long-Term Medical Care Savings to Society

Center for Tobacco Policy Research

$2,953,736
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Conclusions
The results of our economic evaluation for TPCI during the specified time period show a
net positive benefit across the entire initiative, as well as for the workplace and youth
prevention strategies individually. Given the failure to increase the Missouri tobacco tax in
2006, the separate economic evaluation for the strategy to raise support for the tax increase
resulted in a net loss of the entire amount of MFH’s investment in the educational campaign,
as well a total loss of investment by others who funded the political campaign. Had the tobacco
tax ballot initiative passed, the strategy would have resulted in large benefits both in regard
to QALYs and long-term medical savings for the people of Missouri. The additional benefits
from the success of the tobacco tax strategy would have increased the positive net benefit of
TPCI twenty-fold.
These results provide valuable lessons learned and important information for future TPCI efforts,
other tobacco prevention efforts, and decisions regarding MFH’s future efforts to improve the
health of Missourians in its service area. Due to current plans for the initiative to continue an
additional four years, the information presented in this report should inform future decisions on
interventions to support within TPCI as well as the level of resources to dedicate to TPCI efforts.

Recommendations
Prioritize increasing the tax on tobacco products to yield significant long-term savings
The lost opportunity represented by the failure of the tobacco tax shows the value of increasing
the tax in Missouri. This poses the question of how much should be invested in a future effort
to increase the tobacco tax given the large benefits that would be seen. Based on the findings of
this report and evidence-based guidelines for tobacco control (e.g., The Community Guide), it is
recommended that MFH support efforts to increase Missouri’s tobacco tax.
Incorporate policy interventions at each level
of programming to realize savings
The results demonstrate the potential
power of both a statewide initiative and
individual strategies that incorporate
different levels of intervention to reduce
tobacco use (community vs. workplaces/
schools vs. individual youth prevention
and adult cessation efforts). Many of the
grantees that focused on adult smoking
cessation or youth prevention incorporated
policy interventions. Were it not for these
incorporated policy interventions, the
overall findings for cost-benefit and
cost-effectiveness would have resulted in
a net loss for MFH.
Page 9

Recommendations
Advocate for an increase in the
		 tobacco tax.
l

l		

Emphasize policy interventions as a 		
		 main component of a comprehensive 		
		 effort to reduce tobacco use.
l		

		
		
		
		

Continue to conduct cost analyses for
the Tobacco Prevention and Cessation
Initiative and expand the practice to
all Missouri Foundation for Health
initiatives.
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These findings strengthen the idea, both in theory and common sense, that policies prohibiting
smoking promote quitting and adults who want to quit benefit from readily available and
accessible smoking cessation services. Likewise, youth who never initiate and adults who quit are
much more likely to advocate for policies to prohibit tobacco use in public places and are more
likely to support future efforts to raise the state tobacco tax.14,15
Plan and conduct similar analyses across MFH programs to allow for program comparisons
Even with the failure of the tax initiative, our results demonstrate a net-positive benefit for TPCI
overall. Similar efforts to collect cost and benefits for current and future funding programs would
allow comparisons of the relative cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness of MFH’s funded projects
across the main causes of morbidity and mortality and across the strategies adopted by MFH
and its grantees. There is one caveat with this recommendation. Programs focused on other areas
of chronic disease, such as physical activity, nutrition and chronic disease management, do not
have as extensive of a science base as tobacco control. This influences the availability of data to
adequately assess the outcomes for a specific strategy.

Limitations
As with all evaluations generally, and economic evaluations specifically, this work has limitations.
The limitations include design issues, data concerns and the many assumptions made in
conducting any cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. The design issues primarily relate
to our decisions to use two standard measures to calculate benefits, QALYs and long-term
medical savings. Establishing standard, common measures applicable across the three strategies
was necessary to make comparisons among the three and to combine them to measure a total
benefit for TPCI. This is the accepted practice for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses.
This approach likely underestimated the value of the benefit for TPCI since the value of practices
such as capacity-building and recruiting tobacco prevention advocates for life was not included.
Additionally, outcomes other than smokers who quit and youth who will not start smoking, such
as reduced exposure to secondhand smoke, were not included.
The data concerns primarily relate to the total absence of some important data (e.g., volunteer
hours) and the absence of periods of data. These problems result in a less than ideal database
when forced to restrict the analyses to several years’ worth of TPCI and eliminate a small number
of grantees from the analysis. Although we would have preferred to have full data, we do not
believe that these data problems skew the findings in either direction since neither the cost nor
benefits associated with either the excluded years or grantees was included in the analyses.
The final set of limitations concerns the many assumptions that must be made when conducting
economic evaluations. These assumptions are comprehensively and clearly described in an
appendix to this report. All of our assumptions are based on the best information available from
published, peer-reviewed literature and recognized, reputable organizations. In all cases, we have
made the most conservative assumptions. Given this approach, if our assumptions have produced
biased results, they are much more likely to have underestimated, not overestimated, the benefits
of the three strategies and the overall initiative.

Center for Tobacco Policy Research
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Appendix- Assumptions
Strategy 1 (Increase Tobacco Tax)
Costs
1. Cost of MFH staff salaries, benefits, etc. not included.
2. Cost of evaluation and training contracts not included.
3. Number of volunteer hours not included. Data are not available.
Benefits
1. For the actual outcome of tax initiative analysis (“Factual”):
				 a. Assumed no benefits given that the tobacco tax initiative failed; adults influenced to 				
						 quit or kids influenced not to start because of the educational campaign (Show
						 Me Health) are assumed to be minimal.
2. For the “Scenario” analyses:
			 a. The age categories for price elasticity (i.e., price effects on smoking) from the literature 		
						 (Chaloupka, 1999 and Ahmad & Franz, 2008) and the BRFSS Smoking Prevalence
						 Rates for Missouri were not a perfect match; the categories were matched as closely
						 as possible.
				 b. Weighted the decrease in prevalence for smoking among the Missouri population age 		
						 categories by the percentage in those categories; that weighted average was 4.41%.
				 c. Divided the price elasticity (i.e., price effects on smoking) for each age group in half 				
						 because the reported price elasticity is for a decrease in the number of cigarettes 						
						 consumed; half of the elasticity is the actual reduction in prevalence. For every 10%
						 increase in the tobacco tax, the following percentages were used to calculate the 						
						 anticipated reduction in prevalence for each age group:
Age													 15-17		 18-23		 24-29		 30-39		 40-65		 65+
Anticipated % 							 4.2%		 1.8%		 1.5%		 1.0%		 1.0% 1.6%
decrease in prevalence			
Source: Chaloupka, 1999 and Ahmad & Franz, 2008

		 d. Used the reported 1.58 increase in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) for each sustained 		
					 quitter (Keeler et al, 2002 and Ong & Glantz, 2005). This estimate assumes:
						 i.		 The average quitter is 45 years of age.
					 ii. The benefits of quitting cease after age 65.
					 iii. A discount rate of 3%.
					 iv. A 35% probability of relapse.
						 v. A compensation for background quits which would have occurred in the future
								 can be achieved by multiplying the QALYs by a factor of 0.79.
		 e. Lifetime expenditure savings from quitting (Hodgson, 1992) were updated for inflation 		
					 between 1992 and 2007 and were gender-adjusted based on the percent population of
					 males and females in Missouri in 2007.
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Strategy 2 (Workplace/Community Programs)
Costs
1.
			
2.
3.
			
			
4.

Cost of MFH staff salaries, benefits, trainings for grantees, evaluation contracts, etc.
was not included.
Cost of expansion of Quitline services was not included.
Mean hourly wage for all occupations in Missouri in 2007 ($17.90) was used to calculate 				
value of volunteer time (Sources: TIES for number of volunteer hours; Bureau of
Labor Statistics for mean hourly wage).
Removed funding for grantees for whom we do not have programmatic data.

Benefits
1. Followed procedure in the Ong & Glantz 2005 paper to determine number of smokers who 		
			 would quit if a smoke-free worksite policy passed. The procedure accounts for:
				 a. Smokers who would quit anyway, without a policy.
				 b. A 90% compliance with the policy change (only for community-wide policies,
						 not individual worksite policies).
				 c. A 35% relapse rate for quitters.
2. Calculated number of smokers who quit because of cessation classes using TIES quit rate 			
			 data; assumes 35% probability of relapse and is discounted at 3%.
3. Used the reported 1.58 increase in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) for each sustained 				
			 quitter (Keeler, et al, 2002 and Ong & Glantz, 2005). This estimate assumes:
				 a. Average quitter is 45 years of age.
				 b. Benefits of quitting cease after age 65.
				 c. Discount rate of 3%.
			 d. 35% probability of relapse.
				 e. Compensation for background quits that would have occurred in the future can
						 be achieved by multiplying the QALYs by a factor of 0.79.
4. Lifetime medical expenditure savings from quitting (Hodgson, 1992) were updated for 					
			 inflation between 1992 and 2007 and were gender-adjusted based on the percent population
			 of males and females in Missouri in 2007.
5. Benefits from the Kirksville community-wide smoke-free policy were equally divided among
			 the workplace and school strategies because both were involved in its passage.
6. Did not include benefits from removal of exposure to second-hand smoke
			 (e.g., health benefits).

Strategy 3 (School Programs)
Costs
1.
			
2.
			
			
			
3.

Cost of MFH staff salaries, benefits, trainings for grantees, evaluation contracts, etc.
was not included.
Median hourly wage for Missouri high school teachers in 2007 ($21) was used to calculate 			
value of volunteer time since most volunteers were teachers for the school programs 						
(Sources: TIES for number of volunteer hours; Bureau of Labor Statistics for teacher median 		
hourly wage).
Removed funding for grantees for whom we do not have programmatic data.
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Benefits
1. For school-based interventions:
			 a. Took the most conservative approach to estimating the number of youth affected by the
						 intervention; we counted only the students trained to be active participants,
						 not all youth exposed. The exception was one program involving lessons and activities
						 conducted in the classroom. For this program, we also counted students in the classroom.
			 b. Used the rate of youth initiation (0.1021) for the entire U.S. in 2003.
				 c. Used the reported 10% decrease in initiation rate reported in the IOM report , Ending the
						 Tobacco Problem: A Blueprint for a Nation, to determine how many youth would not initiate
						 smoking due to programs.
			 d. Used the reported 3.4 increase in QALYs for each youth who doesn’t start smoking 					
						 (Kaplan et al. and Holtgrave et al.), discounted at 3%
			 e. Lifetime medical expenditure savings for youth who never start smoking (Hodgson, 			
						 1992) were updated for inflation between 1992 and 2007 and were gender-adjusted
						 based on the percent population of males and females in Missouri in 2007.
2. For worksite smoke-free policies involving students:
			 a. Same assumptions as described in worksite section above.
3. Benefits from the Kirksville community-wide smoke-free policy were equally divided among
			 the workplace and school strategies because both indicated involvement in its passage.
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